Can the Third Wave Speak? by Henderson, Jennifer
Atlantis 32.1, 2007 PR www.msvu.ca/atlantis70
Can the Third Wave Speak? 
Jennifer Henderson, Carleton University, is the author of
Settler Feminism and Race Making in Canada (2003) and
co-author of "Of Bombs, Baking, and Blahniks," English
Studies in Canada 31.2-3 (2005).
Abstract
This article suggests that self-proclaimed third-wave
feminism is tied to institutional imperatives and impasses
in Women's Studies. It offers an alternative contemporary
feminist tendency in "cryptofeminism," which suspends
the necessity of affirming feminist identity and reflects
critically on the unpredictable uses and legacies of
feminist thought.
Résumé
Cet article suggère que la troisième vague féministe auto-
proclamée est reliée aux réalités institutionnelles et aux
impasses dans l'Études des femmes. Elle offre une
tendance féministe contemporaine en "cryptoféminisme"
qui suspend la nécessité d'affirmer l'identité féministe et
reflète avec un regard critique les usages imprévisibles et
des legs de la pensée féminine.
The metaphor of waves is a rich one for
thinking about the time, space, and motion of thought
but insofar as it has been applied to modern Western
feminism, what the metaphor seems to have provided is
fairly narrow: a periodization that borrows one feature of
waves in particular - the sense in which waves constitute
movement. What distinguishes feminist theory, for better
or worse, from other veins of cultural and political
theorizing are its complex historical links to social
movement, to activism and to a politics of identity.
Whether or not one should add "always" to that
statement, though, is currently a very vexed question,
since "always" has a way of becoming definitional, and
prescriptive of a particular future for feminist theory. The
current debates about the future of Women's Studies and
the nature of the relationship between second- and
third-wave feminisms turn on differences over the
question of what makes theoretical exploration feminist, if
not an instrumental relation to activism outside of the
academy and not the identity-consolidating reference back
to a feminist subject (Wiegman 1999/2000, 121). Indeed,
one might say that the debates turn on the issue of
prescriptiveness itself, and specifically moral
prescriptiveness, attributed and interpreted in different
ways.
This essay will affirm a current feminist
tendency that leaves open the question of what makes
theory feminist and so suspends the "always" that links
feminist theory to activism and identity. Because what I
shall call "cryptofeminism" abjures these prerequisites, it
does not announce itself as a tendency or as a distinct
third wave of feminist knowledge production. By imposing
some coherence on this kind of work and giving it a
name, I mean to propose that our sense of what
constitutes a third wave of feminist theorizing be
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enlarged from the kind of work that defines itself - and
is marketed - as such, to include work that does not
seek its guarantee of legitimacy or effectivity in familiar
feminist ways.
But why cryptofeminist? The prefix "crypto"
distinguishes the tendency I am naming from
postfeminism, a construction of the popular media which,
in the mid-1980s, sparked a trend of argumentation to
the effect that the need for feminism as a movement and
a mode of thought had waned or disappeared. This was
apparently due to feminism's own successes, to a
perception that feminism no longer seemed worthwhile,
or to feminism's rejection by a younger generation of
women who refused to be seen as victims. Since that
time, we have seen the continuous recycling of media
lifestyle pieces focused on younger women's adoption of
porn styles or middle-class women's happy return to
domesticity. "Post" in this construction means historically
subsequent and also carries the sense of a phenomenon
that is predicated on the cancellation or rejection of
what came before. But the prefix "post" can also signify
an uncertain, unpredictable continuation of something
prior, perhaps on a different level or in different domains
or in different terms, and in this sense, by
cryptofeminism I do mean something like postfeminism.
The value of the prefix, "crypto," though, is precisely its
ambiguity and undecidability. On the one hand, "crypto"
has a neutral, scientific sense that I wish to call into
play, where it refers to a life form with a concealed part
that is below the observable surface - as in cryptobranch:
"an animal with concealed or covered branchiae or gills"
(OED). In this sense, cryptofeminism describes a kind of
work that is feminist in a subterranean way; its analysis
is indebted to developments in late twentieth-century
feminist thought but it is not integrated into a feminist
tradition because it has exceeded what has seemed to be
the proper or recognizeable scope of feminist inquiry,
understood as the struggle for gender equality or the
enunciation of sexual difference. But I also wish to call
upon the more colloquial sense of the prefix "crypto,"
seen in such terms as crypto-communist, or crypto-fascist,
in which the prefix almost always serves as an accusation
of concealed adherence. Insofar as cryptofeminism calls up
this sense, the term registers something of feminism's
current unfashionability - the way that calling someone a
feminist would indeed function in many contexts today as
an accusation. Maybe partly for this reason, and partly
for more sound intellectual reasons (for instance, a
discomfort with identitarian struggles organized around
notions of authentic being) cryptofeminism does not flag
its concerns or its methodology as specifically feminist.
The significance of this implicit distancing, or
disidentification, or disregard for origins, is not decidable
in any abstract, totalizing way. It is certainly true that
feminism within the corporate academy is not immune to
trends and to the commodifications of newness, but this
does not seem to me to be the only condition that
explains cryptofeminism. I see this tendency as a
development out of feminist appropriations of
poststructuralist theories of power and subjectivity and as
the result of a self-reflexive turn within feminism which
has brought with it a curiosity about the history of
feminist critical tools and an inclination to be watchful
about the kind of work that they do. Cryptofeminism
may well be a peculiarly Anglo-American phenomenon and
probably also a discipline-specific one too - work that is
fairly localized in historically-inflected cultural studies.
Feminist knowledge-production may not look like this
from the point of view of other disciplines, and it is
doubtful that it looks like this globally: all the more
reason to be clear that I do not mean to position it as
a universal frontier. 
Under the banner of cryptofeminism, I think of
a number of examples within cultural studies, since that
is my field: the recent work of Lauren Berlant on
"national sentimentality," in which she traces the legacy
of 19th-century feminism's elevation of a sentimental
identification with suffering into "the rights talk of
national and international public spheres." Berlant argues
that in "the eradication of pain [for] the achievement of
Atlantis 32.1, 2007 PR www.msvu.ca/atlantis72
justice" in contemporary American public culture, we
should read the legacy of a feminism that focused on
spectacular and exceptional instances of private pain
(2000, 44). By "exaggerating the value of
transformations that happen primarily within individual
consciences," this sentimental feminism of the later
19th-century participated in laying the groundwork for
this reduction of the social and of subjectivity to the
zone of trauma (44). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak is also
doing work that exposes some of the new problems
produced by feminism's successful incorporation into
broader political discourses. Her work on the
"credit-baiting" of poor women in rural India through
World Bank and NGO programmes that extend loans to
women in the name of female empowerment criticizes the
incorporation of "unexamined universalist feminism"
within institutions of global governance (1999, 220, 245).
For Spivak, the extension of credit to poor rural women,
celebrated in the West as a panacea for developing-world
poverty, puts liberal feminist ideas in the service of
global capital as it endeavours to extend its reach. There
is also the recent work of Mary Poovey, no doubt the
most provocative example of cryptofeminism I can think
of, since she goes so far as to frame her current work
on the history of the disciplining of Western forms of
knowledge as an attempt to move beyond the "paradigm
of denunciation" and unmasking which she believes
characterizes her own earlier, feminist work on Victorian
writing and gender (1998, 23). What interests her now,
she writes in the Introduction to A History of the Modern
Fact, are epistemological developments that "predat[e] -
but prepar[e] for - the emergence of the identity
categories that dominate so much of late 20th-century
[social and cultural] criticism" (1998, 25). Like Berlant
and Spivak, Poovey can be seen to be stepping back
from the givenness of "women" as an identity category
and as a category that guarantees progressivity, and
asking how it can congeal and be put to use in
unexpected and problematic ways.
In trying to suggest what might be valuable
about cryptofeminism, I am trying, in part, to find a way
of accounting for my bewilderment at the evaporation of
a recognizably feminist agenda or identity in most of my
own current work, though I would like to think that it
comes out of feminist theorizing. To be more precise, the
work comes out of an internal critique of feminist
thought that studied feminism's implication in modern
forms of liberal governmentality or statecraft (Foucault
1991, 102). From there, I have moved on to research
focussed on childhood, citizenship, and globalization: from
"woman" as the subject and object of moral governance,
in other words, to the child as the target of schemes of
subject-shaping. But since I keep finding myself in a
position where I am supposed to have something to say
about third-wave feminism, even though I feel distant
from the trenches and even though I actually think of
my students as the third wave and my mentors as the
second wave, I have decided that I am probably not
alone in this limbo. This position is not exceptional, in
fact it is probably not even generational, and so it might
be interesting to ask how it stands alongside a different
tendency that proclaims itself as feminism's third wave:
how does cryptofeminism do a different kind of work
from some of the other books on the shelves - some
academic, some more popular, but sharing a kind of
programmatic promise with titles such as Third Wave
Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism and Manifesta:
Young Women, Feminism, and the Future?
If self-reflexivity is one of the hallmarks of this
self-proclaimed third-wave work, there are nevertheless
different kinds of reflexivity, and I want to suggest that
cryptofeminism's reflexivity is more open and uncertain in
its effects than the kind exemplified in these sorts of
third-wave primers, which tend toward autobiographical
explorations of the politics of subjectivity and
self-representation (Gillis and Munford 2004, 173). The
critical reflexivity of cryptofeminism, instead of focusing
on the theme of women's experience (now diversified in
its range and adapted to contradiction), scrutinizes
feminism's own conceptual instruments and the traditional
www.msvu.ca/atlantis PR Atlantis 32.1, 2007 73
forms of legitimation of feminist knowledge, namely, the
evidence of personal experience, the relevance of
knowledge to activism, and knowledge's capacity to
provoke identification, thereby producing a collective
feminist subject. Attentive to differences in historical
contexts, cryptofeminism recognizes, for instance, that to
invoke the authenticity of experience (the second-wave
slogan "the personal is political") in the age of a
diminishing public sphere is not to counter oppression
with consciousness-raising but to enlist the currency of
personalized, therapeutic rhetoric in what Berlant
describes as a culture of private pain. Instead of
providing a "roadmap to activism" (Baumgardner and
Richards 2000, 23) or leading to the articulation of a
generationally-coherent standpoint, therefore,
cryptofeminism's methodological and historical reflexivity
leads in unpredictable directions, towards unforeseeable
objects and problems that emerge from a reckoning with
multiplicity and mutability in the operations of power
and - perhaps most especially - a reckoning with
feminism's own lessons about the dangers of reduplicating
problems of normativity and hegemony through a
discourse of identity. 
Gillis and Munford note that self-identified
third-wave feminism defines itself against an academy
that it perceives to have "little impact on the material
needs of women, which can only be redressed by activist
activities" (2004, 169). However, this anti-academic
stance does not prevent the self-identified third wave
from finding a place within the academy, specifically
within Women's Studies programmes and departments
where its activist and generationally-specific credentials
are absorbed as a means of renewing some of those
traditionally feminist forms of legitimation I've named
above. Thus, while other observers worry that the third
wave's framing of itself in terms of generational
antagonism leads to unproductive divisiveness within
feminism and "threatens the progress of feminist politics"
(Gillis and Munford 2004, 176), in some institutional
settings that very antagonism underpins a kind of
paradoxical relegitimation, an affirmation that the
struggle is still, at least, being renewed, and still
characterized by spontaneous, autonomous pulls toward
an activist outside to the academy. Cryptofeminism, in
contrast, is not amenable to these young versus old,
outside versus inside the academy oppositions: it is a
matter of theoretical orientation rather than age, and
insofar as it is located within the academy, in disciplines
outside of Women's Studies, it does not need to foster
anti-academic, young women's activist and
autobiographical feminist discourse, as a kind of
ethnographic support and institutional-political necessity.
What gives cryptofeminism its minimal coherence as an
alternative tendency, is not a particular theme or agenda
of thought, but its movement away from the kinds of
impasses which attend the reinforcement of those
traditional forms of legitimation in the place where
feminist knowledge-production has been institutionalized,
in the field of Women's Studies. 
There are other possibilities to explore in the
metaphor of waves, besides the idea of movements in
linear succession: the way that waves move in two
directions, with a forward and backward movement; the
way that sound waves radiate outward, dispersing and
diffusing as they go; and finally, the way that waves
move particles around, and sheer accident or contingency
determines what particles, what remainders, they leave in
their wake - as well as what will be made of those
remainders.
The idea of a multidirectional movement
complicates the emphasis on periodization that goes along
with the most familiar invocation of feminism's three
waves as a three-point linear succession. Feminism's
waves are not self-identical, unidirectional, or discrete. As
Cecily Devereux has argued, in spite of attempts of
"post-imperial, third-wave" feminists to distance
themselves from early twentieth-century feminism framed
within imperialist and eugenical ideologies, some of the
positions of those early Canadian feminists (like the
demands for birth control, sexual education, and support
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for mothers) persist in present pro-choice feminist
agendas (2005, 12). Drawing the line between the second
and third waves is a necessarily arbitrary and political
act, since we lack a clear sense of the boundaries of the
second wave (Bailey 1997, 19). For instance, the critique
of the unicity of "woman" and the uniformity of
women's oppression which has become axiomatic in the
third wave can be seen as an internal critique - as the
second wave's critique of itself - and hence this wave
may be understood as already containing within itself a
kind counter-movement, which casts back certain
presuppositions. What similarly interferes with an easy
sense of feminist waves moving in linear succession is the
fact that certain underground, low-budget forms of
third-wave feminist cultural production (photocopied
'zines, graffiti) not only resemble in their mode of
production "all those uncopyrighted, mimeographed
articles that made their way across the country during
the second wave" (Orr 1997, 37-38), they also return to
the manifesto tone of the early second wave, to the
extent of reinvoking and rehabilitating some of that
moment's key catchwords - "solidarity" and "patriarchy,"
to name a few. Riot Grrrls can sound a bit like Valerie
Solanas, and so clearly there is a complex temporality at
work in the third wave, which may involve, as one of its
features, different chronotopes or space/times for
academic and subcultural feminism - not to mention for
Anglo-American feminism and the feminisms of other
geopolitical spaces. 
It is certainly possible to identify a number of
features that distinguish the self-proclaimed third wave:
there are the themes of multiplicity and contradiction
and ambivalence; the new centre of gravity in sexuality
(with personal testaments to the power of transgressive
pleasure clearly indebted to the early 1980s pro-sex
critique of anti-porn feminism), and the axiomatic sense
of the entanglement of racism and sexism which is
perhaps one of the reasons why we see more situated,
textured, micrological and empirical forms of analysis
(one hardly ever hears talk of the symbolic order
anymore, for instance); there is the displacement of the
assumption of a mechanical solidarity by talk of
coalitions or temporarily achieved affinities (Dean 1997,
245); there is the prominence of the strategy of ironic
appropriation and complicitous critique, especially of
received modes of femininity; there is an unmistakeable
intercalation with popular culture. Indeed, one of the
most striking characteristics of the third wave is its
"complex and shifting, rather than simple and binary"
(Wald 2002, 194) relationship with consumerism. Third
wave feminism is a fully mediatized feminism; it
represents itself in a hall of mirrors, in other words, in a
field that profers different representations of feminism -
as consumable image (what we might call commodity
feminism), sometimes as historical image capable of
informing a self-reflexive, genealogical awareness of
feminism as a discontinuous struggle, but more often
than not as an image which simply announces that
feminism is history, in the sense of being a thing dead
and buried. 
The striking emergence of a cluster of practices
centring on the signifier "girl"' is another distinguishing
feature of self-identified third-wave feminism. These
practices range from the conspicuous, strategic
performance of girlishness by female performers
attempting to create avenues of feminist agency, to the
appearance of "girl studies" as a new ethnographic
subfield of Women's Studies. On the one hand, the
discovery of the girl as a new feminist frontier can be
understood in terms of a project to disentangle girlhood
from associations with helplessness and triviality; however,
as Gayle Wald has argued, the risk attending these
attempts at rearticulating girlhood is that of
rehabilitating a new ethnocentric universal. So even as
the appearance of the girl at the centre of the third
wave provides another distinguishing feature, it is also
indicative of the way in which the third wave encounters
and to some extent repeats familiar problematics. 
The prominence of the girl, and the new
emphasis within feminist cultural studies on youth
www.msvu.ca/atlantis PR Atlantis 32.1, 2007 75
culture, more generally, speak to the self-proclaimed third
wave's interest in questions of generational difference,
and indeed to the way in which it has participated in
the construction of itself as the daughter of the second
wave. If sisterhood was the preferred figure for female
relationality in the second wave, the mother-daughter
relation seems to be the figuration that drives the third
wave and this shift in figures of female relationality
registers another shift, from a focus on women's
difference from men to differences between women
themselves. So a second metaphor seems to be embedded
in our sense of feminism's waves, as soon as we start
describing a third. When we talk about feminism's three
waves, it seems difficult not to imagine successive
generations of politicized women in corsets and serious
political t-shirts and ironic fish-nets (in that order), all
related along a maternal line that joins and divides them
through the dynamics of reproduction, inheritance, and
Oedipal conflict. 
To be fair, the generational metaphor is not
always a liability in feminist discourse: it has been used
productively, for example, in psychoanalytic
understandings of the trouble that 20th-century feminism
has had in acknowledging aggression and rivalry between
women (Creet 1991; Whitford 1994). The generational
paradigm can be a conceptual lever that opens questions
about feminism's repressions and internal struggles - and
those struggles do sometimes play themselves out along
generational lines. But even then, there can be certain
oversimplication at work, since these struggles, as Diane
Elam has argued, are often really about coming to terms
with power in feminism and the historically-acquired
power of feminism. More specifically, the struggles are
about the thorny problem of institutional incorporation
which has raised new questions for feminism that a
model of power focused on marginalization and exclusion
is ill-equipped to address. "If feminists have achieved
positions of power, and if feminist arguments have
achieved a certain cultural weight, how is feminism to
deal with this phenomenon?," asks Elam (1997, 56-57).
Perhaps the principal means through which
feminism has managed the problem of power is identity
politics, or what Elam describes as "patriarchy with a
face-lift" (64): a politics that recognizes individuals
insofar as they conform to a particular identity category;
hierarchies of difference and identity; and a relation that
establishes identity through opposition. Whether we see
identity politics as a singular event that explodes the
false universality of women's experience at some point
late in the second wave or as the transhistorical project
of feminism itself, what is striking at this juncture is how
aptly these features of identity politics describe the
generationalism of self-proclaimed third-wave feminism,
which finds its coherence in a differentiation from a
second wave positioned as prior in a family line.
I am certainly not the first to register a worry
about the work of the generational metaphor. My own
worry about the generational metaphor has to do with
the way that it functions as an incitement to identity
politics. The metaphor sets in motion a mirror game,
whereby on the one side (the side of
institutionally-located feminists), invoking the
mothers-and-daughters figuration functions
passive-aggressively calling up the obligations of familial
loyalty and indebtedness, while on the other side,
rejection of the dutiful daughter position through the
assertion of a transgressive generational difference ensures
that this tendency remains constitutively bound - in the
mode of rebellious offspring - to the tradition that it
thinks it is departing from. I do not mean to trivialize
the work of younger women with the use of the term
"rebellion"; my point is that there is an incitement to
frame third-wave work as generational, and I want to
suggest that this incitement may be found in maternal
gestures of voice-giving which stem from the desire to
"neutralize a perceived threat of nonreproductivity or
nonattribution," as Judith Roof puts it, in
post-second-wave work (1997, 73). A rebellion that is all
in the family is at least a sign of progeny, of continued
life, and a sign of life which may perhaps also serve to
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identify and recentre a specifically Anglo-American
parentage. So the daughter's rebellion may be the
counterpart of a strategy of crisis-management, and may
amount to taking up an autobiographical voice that is
bequeathed from elsewhere, from a place of anxiety and
relative institutional privilege. Hence the worry that is
registered in the title of my essay, which asks a question
about who is speaking and under what conditions a third
wave could possibly speak.
I return now to the suggestion I made earlier
that there is a tendency historically coincident with the
self-identified third wave that does not speak as such, by
which it will now be clear that I mean: a tendency that
does not frame its project in generational terms or,
indeed, in identitarian ones, and perhaps could not even
say how it is connected to practical struggle, since it has
exceeded its original organization around an identitarian
domain and around one particular form of subjection. I
will try to give cryptofeminism a less nebulous shape now
by comparing its way of dealing with the problem of
moral prescriptiveness to that of the
generationally-defined third wave, since these two
tendencies, as I suggested at the outset, both respond to
a problematization of moral prescriptiveness within
feminism, although they attribute and interpret that
problem in different ways. 
As I have observed, the self-proclaimed third
wave interprets the principles and dispositions of the
second wave as normative, and hence as moral in the
sense of a code that is embodied and enforced by an
authority that waves the flag of sisterhood but acts like
a puritan mother. The rebellion that takes shape in
relation to this moral spectre assumes the form of the
bad daughter's impropriety - her refusal to inherit
second-wave property. These gestures are not necessarily
unconscious; they can be self-reflexive and ironic. But
even then, there is still the stabilization of a sense of
generational difference that, in turn, stabilizes a family
narrative of feminism. 
Here is an example from an essay in a
collection entitled, Jane Sexes It Up: True Confessions of
Feminist Desire, in which the editor, Merri Lisa Johnson,
provides autobiographical reflections on her inheritance of
a second-wave reading of violent sex as misogynist
violation and wittily figures this ambivalently-received
inheritance in terms of the influence of an eccentric aunt.
Johnson describes the appearance of this overly directive
aunt at moments in her own life in which "pleasure and
power interlace," such as in her enjoyment of the
representation of violent masculinity in David Fincher's
1999 film, Fight Club. "Interpreting the correspondence
between sex scenes and fight scenes in terms of violence
against women seems off," she observes: "Is feminism
helping me to see the movie more clearly, then, or is it
a lady wearing a fancy hat in the row ahead of me in a
theater? [...] As feminists, we've learned to critique
[violent masculinity], we know there's something wrong
with it, it has been removed to the space of
transgression, that which we are not supposed to want"
(Johnson 2002, 42-43).
And thus, she observes, "My doubts about
feminism as a mode of analysis reveal themselves most
irresolutely in moments like these, when my feelings or
experiences conflict with what I think a feminist should
feel, when I respond as a feminist - flattening out the
nuances of life and love according to this false icon of
the cultural imagination ('Go get something pierced,'
Aunt Feminism shoos me from her room)" (2002, 38-39).
As Johnson argues that the inherited critiques
are inadequate to the ambivalence of her own
generation, her point entrenches a sense of generational
difference that, in turn, reinforces a family narrative of
feminism. Her essay acknowledges and indeed probes the
constructed nature of pleasure and desire, but it is worth
noting the way in which it is shaped by an assumption
(an expectation? a demand?) that the purview of
third-wave discourse is historically-differentiated
experience, that it is this kind of generationally-inflected
native informancy. Cryptofeminism, in contrast, is not
bound by this self-referential scope, and this is partly
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because it sees the problem of moral prescriptiveness
somewhat differently, as history's bequest of a proper
sphere for feminist thought, and it responds to this
problem by adopting distance from the moral-political
demands associated with that proper sphere. 
From the point of view of cryptofeminism, the
problem of moral prescriptiveness has to do with the way
that feminist theorizing traditionally has been forced to
seek its legitimacy in identitarianism, sentimental power,
and activist relevance, and especially the way that these
traditional forms of legitimation have been
institutionalized. While it is clear that any intellectual
project or institutional site organized around a category
of social identity is vulnerable to impermanence and
hence to becoming primarily defensive, as Wendy Brown
has noted there is something particularly perverse about
the way that Women's Studies has come to sustain itself
as the arena that re-enacts "in an emotional register"
the discovery of the incoherence and exclusivity of its
own foundational category, women (Wiegman 1999/2000,
215). Brown maintains that the field is bound to
rehearse a "compensatory cycle of guilt and blame"
precisely because it is structured by an
"original...conceptual subordination of race (and all other
forms of social stratification) to gender" (Wiegman 125).
And Women's Studies continues to be fundamentally
structured this way because it has not ceased to see its
raison d'être as primarily affective and political: as Robyn
Wiegman puts it, it exists to reproduce "the social
organization of women as a political sign," to generate a
sense of belonging in subjects who will see themselves, in
spite of it all, as one with the field's object of study
(121). 
Needless to say, this political and affective
project reproduces the intellectual problem of identity
studies, that schemas of power developed to understand
oppressions related to identity fall short of grasping the
historicity and multifacetedness of subjection. Such
identitarian schemas also tend to underwrite political
projects that necessitate the codification of specific social
markings as positivist, isolatable attributes which then
become means of bureaucratic regulation (Brown 1995,
66). The problem is not just that the contemporary
institutional context of Women's Studies fosters a version
of the third wave that is bound by the kinds of
identitarian constraints I've been associating with the
generational metaphor. It is also that Women's Studies
seems ill-equipped to recognize and respond to a changed
context of knowledge-production of which one important
feature is the assimilation of feminist discourses. Women's
Studies own institutionalized demand for knowledge with
evident ties to identity and social activism currently
dovetails with the structural (ie., funding-related) demand
for practical, instrumental knowledge that would tie all of
our knowledge-production in the humanities and social
sciences to bureaucratic projects of social change or
improvement, with change or improvement often
implicitly invested with the imperatives of capitalist
innovation or national competitiveness in a global
context.
Cryptofeminism responds to late
twentieth-century feminism's internal critique of the
universality of "woman" and more especially to
genealogical work on feminism's historical entanglement
in class formation and race making and the deployment
of sexuality with a wariness about doing work that would
authorize itself using the traditional legitimations of
feminist intellectual work - the sentimental claim to be
working on behalf of others (Wiegman 1999/2000, 116),
"the disguise of some female virtue" (Whitford 1994,
387) or the logic of pain and suffering that re-naturalizes
identity and thereby "resubjugates the resisting subject"
(Brown 1995, 64). If the above-named historical
processes have formed some of the conditions of
possibility for the construction of "woman" as a moral
category, then perhaps it makes sense to resist the
pressure from within and without feminism to frame our
questions in the terms of sentiment or virtue or injury. 
In arriving at that last point, I realize that I
arrive at a contradiction that exposes my own strategy of
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oversimplification, because clearly, even from my
description of the self-identified third-wave, it is clear
that this tendency sees itself as resisting pressure from
within and without feminism to frame its questions in
virtuous terms. What this shows is that we should not
attempt to draw sharp lines between tendencies: it is
probably true that sometimes one is a cryptofeminist and
sometimes one engages in the kind of feminist
generational discourse that I have been describing,
depending on the context and the nature of the question.
Perhaps the difference is between a narrowly generational
discourse that serves the purpose of a kind of
ethnographic informancy, and a broader genealogical (as
opposed to generational) sense of feminisms' histories
that moves one out to other questions, so that something
that might initially have been called feminist theorizing
outgrows the confines of gender or women's experience
and takes one to other domains, which now absolutely
require a historical sense of the impact that feminist
discourse has had on conceptualizations of such things as
the public sphere, political community, and minority
struggle. As I suggested earlier, waves radiate outward,
dispersing and diffusing as they go, and they also leave
material in their wake. Part of what cryptofeminism does
is to track what has been made of those remainders, or
- to borrow Joan Scott's more elegant phrasing - what
"shifted geological formations" the "reverberations" of
feminism have left behind (2002, 11).
Let me end with a caveat: Of course one needs
to worry about how this kind of dispersal and
transcoding of feminism into cryptofeminism is an
intellectual development that is shaped by other kinds of
conditions, ideological and structural ones. What does it
mean to be cryptic when you are already pronounced to
be passé? As Cathryn Bailey points out, the
self-proclaimed third wave is undoubtedly influenced by
"the negative stereotypes [of feminism] issuing from
backlash media"; the hall of mirrors in which feminism
represents itself today "not only influence[s] those hostile
to feminism but may also work insidiously on feminists,"
and not just, as she proposes, the younger, "developing
feminists" who explicitly distance themselves from the
second wave (1997, 24), but also those feminist lifeforms
- to return to my scientific conceit - who seem to be
keeping their distinguishing branchiae or gills concealed.
One of the defining contradictions of our
moment, indeed, is this contradictory coexistence of
feminism's social and institutional assimilation, on the
one hand, with what Barbara Godard (2002) has
described as the wholesale decapitalization of feminist
cultural production under conditions of neoliberal
restructuring, on the other. Writing of the fortunes of
state-sponsored feminist cultural production in Canada
after two decades of restructuring, Godard observes that
the promotion of market values (through the new funding
imperatives to address a large audience, to promote high
cultural value or produce practical, applied knowledge)
has had particularly withering consequences for feminist
cultural production with a broadly critical and
transformative project.
And yet, in spite of this destruction of
state-funded feminist spaces of cultural production, as E.
Ann Kaplan reminds us, feminism has made certain gains
since the 1970s and 1980s and these gains have
"creat[ed] new situations with problems that could not
have been foreseen when second-wave women made their
demands for gender equality, fair treatment and social
change to accommodate women's needs" (Kaplan 2003,
5). Among other developments, Kaplan is thinking of the
way in which motherhood and other kinds of domestic
labour can now be represented in the problematic,
class-bound language of choice (4). Somewhat along the
same lines, Patricia Mann has argued that among the
radical social unmoorings effected by the advent of
neoliberalism is the "social enfranchisement of women"
that entails major dislocations to the patriarchal
middle-class family. This state of things has a further
unintended consequence in the increasing centrality of
what used to be considered women's issues, most notably
the issue of childcare (1997, 229, 223). On the one
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hand, then, many of the conditions of possibility for
feminist research and cultural production of the
exploratory, dissenting kind have disappeared; on the
other hand, we have to reckon with the ambiguous
consequences of certain feminist successes. There are, in
short, different kinds of amnesias that need to be
guarded against: there is the kind of amnesia that fails
to register change (feminism's institutionalization), there
is also the kind of amnesia that is too distracted by
what seems new to observe constellations of the past and
present in our midst and take account of important
losses. 
I do not have a comfortable or satisfying way
of reconciling cryptofeminism with these structural
conditions, but I think what can be said is that
cryptofeminism might be equipped to take account of
such conditions, precisely insofar as neoliberalism involves
an absorption and co-optation of some of the language
and imperatives of second-wave feminism - including, as I
suggested earlier, the idea that knowledge-production
must legitimate itself through some evident link to social
betterment. Maybe the historical experience of feminism's
institutionalization and assimilation that cryptofeminism
takes as its point of departure and turns into
methodological first principle - to avoid assuming "fixed
relationships between entities [and to] treat them
[instead] as the mutable effects of (temporally, culturally,
historically) specific power dynamics" (Scott 2002, 6) -
positions cryptofeminism to be able to critique the
current constraints on our knowledge-production that go
by progressive names. In any case the challenge seems to
me to be one of finding a register for speaking about
the present that avoids both the apocalypticism that
would see our moment as an endtime of feminist history
and the epochalism that would fixate on the idea of
distinct and self-identical eras, permitting our own to be
heralded as totally new. 
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